TENTH INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL CONFERENCE
"CONUNDRUM IN ARMS CONTROL: THE NEW MILLENNIUM"
STATEMENT BY SENATOR PETE V. DOMENICI
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As all of you here today know, this is the Tenth Anniversary of this Arms Control Conference. In light of this fact, I would like to take a few minutes to honor the Conference's founder, organizer and inspiration, Dr. James Brown.

Dr. Brown's career has long emphasized arms control. Not only has Jim Brown dedicated himself to this conference for the past decade, but he has also been a practitioner. He served in several different capacities at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, where he helped develop verification regimes for elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. He also worked in the Pentagon as a special assistant to the Deputy Undersecretary for Planning and Resources.

His academic resume is also impressive. Jim was a professor at Southern Methodist University, was a founding director of the John Tower Center for Political Studies and co-taught courses with Senator Tower for eight years. He has also authored and edited nine volumes of scholarly work and 35 articles on Arms Control.

One of Jim's colleagues offered the following comments about him:

"Jim is a truly remarkable person. It was solely his individual effort that

created the conference at Southern Methodist University and made it one of the top arms control conferences in the world. His reputation, his integrity, his personal relationships with a broad range of policy makers throughout the global arms control community and their trust in him, along with his tireless effort, has enabled the Albuquerque conference to grow even more in stature each year bringing credit on Sandia, the Department of Energy and the State of New Mexico."

In honor of Dr. James Brown, I'd like to offer him a copy of a statement entered into the Congressional Record earlier this week about his person and this conference.

We are glad you decided to bring this conference to New Mexico. It's a unique and appropriate occasion in light of our state's history and work in the area of arms control. Thank you.

We have realized great progress in the last decade on the arms control front. Just a few highlights might include:

- the unilateral withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, followed closely by Russia's commitments to do the same;

- ratification of START I and START II by the U.S. Senate;

- ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention by the U.S. Senate;

- and indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995.

However, I must admit that we've made less progress in the last five years than in the first half of the decade. One could easily conclude that we have not yet figured out whether traditional methods of arms control are applicable to this dramatically changed and constantly changing international landscape.

In light of this situation, the title **"Conundrum in Arms Control: The New Millennium"** for this year's conference is fitting. And I can well imagine that the first panel at this conference offered a range of perspectives on this front. While we are still a long way from clearly defining the roles and objectives of our national security agencies and apparatus in the new millennium, the conundrum is particularly true in arms control.

The changes since the Fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 have been nothing less than dramatic. The unexpected end of the Cold War left us convinced of the superiority of the democracy and free markets – but grasping at straws for solutions to new problems and new threats. The world is undergoing rapid shifts in security perceptions and

strategic calculations. The web of arms control treaties, both those in force and those awaiting entry into force, are caught in the current of transition.

In this new millenium of possibilities, we appear undecided as to what strategy to implement or what priorities to set. Without a clear strategy and focused efforts, we will fail to take appropriate steps in reducing the dangers.

The radical reduction in sheer numbers of nuclear weapons reflects progress. At the same time, however, we are not doing as much as is possible. And we are certainly not adequately addressing the threat of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons proliferation.

There have been failures in the recent past as well, such as:

< not foreseeing or preventing the nuclear tests in South Asia;
< an inability to link future START treaties and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty;
< not addressing tactical weapons in START III negotiations.

I cannot begin to address the entire landscape of possibilities or the shortfalls in our current policies. So, I would like to focus on two specific areas of concern:

< First, the role of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and

< Second, U.S.-Russian non-proliferation programs;

In this new international security environment we have not yet clearly established the strategic role of our nuclear arsenal. Almost

everyone would agree that our arsenal remains the cornerstone of our national defense. However, we have not integrated our arsenal into a new strategic vision or defined precisely what role it might serve in this new world.

The fact that we have not done so has a very concrete impact on daily decisions in my office and the Department of Energy. Last year an overwhelming majority of Congress passed legislation to reorganize the DOE. The establishment of a semi-autonomous National Nuclear Security Agency within that Department will undoubtedly help streamline decision making and increase efficiencies within the Agency responsible for stockpile stewardship and our non-proliferation policies and programs.

However, the NNSA will remain limited in its ultimate efficiency without more concrete definition of the desired size, precise configuration and support structures required for our nuclear arsenal. I am considering legislation that would mandate a more thorough assessment of our nuclear arsenal and nuclear weapons infrastructure in order to begin addressing this concern.

Obviously, such an assessment requires making concrete and calculated decisions about our nuclear arsenal and non-proliferation programs within the framework of existing and contemplated arms control agreements.

I spend a lot of my time as a Senator focused on a specific subset of proliferation issues - namely, U.S. programs designed to reduce the potential proliferation threat from the Newly Independent States. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program under the Department of Defense and several Department of Energy programs

are reducing these dangers in concrete ways.

I would like to underscore just one, spectacular example. Since 1991, the CTR program has assisted the denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Today, all three of these countries are members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapons states.

However, we continue to face challenges involving the warheads, materials, and expertise developed during the days of the Cold War. Arguably the greatest global security challenge involves containment and management of proliferation threats – many of which are in danger of being fueled with former Soviet capabilities.

Congress is highly supportive of activities that address these proliferation threats, as they've demonstrated with strong funding for several, milestone-driven, programs. But where questions about a program's effectiveness or goals have surfaced, Congress is far more cautious.

The Cooperative Threat Reduction program is a good example of the type of program that Congress supports well. At any given time, the CTR programs can quantify progress. Concrete progress equals Congressional support.

Similarly, the Highly Enriched Uranium program can catalog the amount of material converted from weapons use. The new plutonium disposition program must similarly define its contributions. These kinds of initiatives receive strong support from Congress.

As just one example, Congress appropriated $525 Million to achieve two specific non-proliferation goals:

- to maintain momentum in conversion of Russian highly enriched uranium, and

- to offer an incentive for conclusion of a bilateral agreement on plutonium disposition.

With these parameters in mind, let me turn to discussion of issues associated with the Russian nuclear weapons complex. That complex contains three main challenges: weapons production capacity, materials for those weapons, and people. Each area presents a potential proliferation threat.

Congress has provided strong support for programs associated with the materials, where goals and progress are easier to define and measure. The other two areas present unusual challenges, and it's been difficult to structure programs that receive significant support.

The "brain drain" issue reflects a concern that scientists and engineers with critical knowledge might sell their knowledge. The weapons production issue raises concern about Russia's ability to rapidly reconstitute forces that could invalidate future arms control agreements. Both these issues are focused in the nuclear cities.

We already have several programs, like the Nuclear Cities Initiative, Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, and the International Science and Technology Center that impact brain-drain issues. These programs can point to some real successes; IPP has 19 technologies in or near commercialization.

Nevertheless, each of these initiatives is struggling for resources.

And despite our best intentions and some superb opportunities for progress, our Nuclear Cities Initiative has barely begun to scratch the surface in dealing with the problem of a cash-strapped and over-sized nuclear complex. To date, NCI has not garnered enough Congressional support to have stable and realistic funding.

A significant part of Congressional frustration arises from the wide range of uncoordinated programs dealing with non-proliferation. Each program has reasonable goals, but they aren't integrated into one coherent thrust led by a focused and committed Administration.

The net effect of our non-proliferation programs is far less than it could be and needs to be. These programs are begging for coherent oversight and inter-agency cooperation. To address this need, which is far from new, the 1996 Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation called for appointment of a high-level non-proliferation czar.

The Administration has refused to act on this law with its very logical mandate. That's unfortunate, because optimized non-proliferation policies, whether global or specific to the Newly Independent States, require coordination across agencies and an ability to allocate funding commensurate with objectives.

Without such coordination, inter-agency turf fights remain unresolved, potential synergies aren't exploited, and redundancy and inefficiency can run rampant.

I want to significantly advance our progress in the nuclear cities. However, to gain sufficient advocacy for a major funding increase, the program must demonstrate rapid progress in downsizing and an ability for the U.S. to track progress against verifiable milestones that support a Russian complex consistent with their future national security

requirements.

I'm now drafting legislation that I'll propose later this year to address these concerns with the Russian complex. My goal will be to substantially increase the funding and scope of the NCI to assist the Russian Federation in downsizing its military nuclear complex, to authorize a variety of mechanisms in addition to commercialization, and to measure its progress against realistic and transparent milestones.

My legislation will demand that funding for this expanded program, for the 2002 fiscal year and beyond, be contingent on making concrete progress on key issues of strategic interest to both countries, including:

< Demonstrable conversion from military to civilian activities at the four cities participating in the FY 2001 program.

< Development of a ten year plan by the Russian Federation for a nuclear weapons complex downsized to reflect the changing national security needs of Russia. This plan should reflect a production capacity consistent with future arms control agreements.

< Increased transparency of Russian production capacity and materials inventories to eventually match that of the United States.

I will also attempt in my legislation to increase pressure on the next Administration to finally follow the law that requires better coordination among the multitude of proliferation programs.

I'll be introducing this legislation later this year. In my view, it's likely that this increase will be accepted by Congress and the

Administration, if the specific safeguards that I've proposed are included. Chief among these is my call for progress to be measured against concrete verifiable milestones that are agreed upon by both nations.

Of course, significant cooperation from the Russian government must occur for milestones to be met. That won't happen unless they concur that these steps are also in their best interests.

I believe progress in this area is in the best interests of both nations. As long as both accept future goals of dramatically reduced nuclear weapons, it's in our mutual interests to accomplish the transition with as much care and as little proliferation risk as possible. It's also in each nation's interests for the other to maintain a sufficiently credible complex to support realistic national security objectives. To the extent that we can take these steps in a mutually transparent way, we should be able to assure each other of our future intentions.

Lastly, I would like to suggest that the progress between the United States and the Russian Federation on strategic reductions and non-proliferation can provide a template for future multilateral programs on arms reduction among the nuclear weapons states.

Within the scope of these programs we are being challenged to develop techniques and processes to increase transparency and achieve verification without compromising national security. Challenges remain in the area of warhead dismantlement, but we've made substantial progress in devising mutually satisfactory means of verification in many other areas.

On this front I would like to underscore the unique contribution of our national laboratories. They have repeatedly led the charge in

coming to terms with the difficulties of implementation and formulating workable solutions.

In closing, I would like to thank the Cooperative Monitoring Center and Sandia for its support of this conference. And, once again, I want to acknowledge the tireless efforts of Jim Brown in making this conference a success.